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REAL PROPERTY SURVEY
I. OVERVIEW
In 1991, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed a variety of
issues within the scope of Real Property law. In the landlord tenant con-
text, the court considered whether the presence of a defaulting tenant
was a sufficient measure of damages in a breach of contract claim' and
whether a commercial tenant could be relieved from complying with a
"clear and unambiguous" provision in a lease.2 In the area of ease-
ments, the Tenth Circuit discussed when to balance the equities and
public policies of a situation when granting an injunction.3 Finally, in
the sphere of eminent domain, the court discussed vestment of a prop-
erty interest when federal approval is required. 4 This Article will ex-
amine these significant Tenth Circuit decisions.
II. A DEFAULTING LESSEE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW
DIMINUTION IN PROPERTY VALUE.
In John A. Henry & Co. v. T. G. & Y. Stores Co.,5 the Tenth Circuit
concluded that evidence by an appraiser 6 showing that a lessee's history
of default would make the property harder to sell was a measure of dam-
ages sufficiently certain to support a claim for diminution in property
value based on breach of contract.
7
A. Factual Background
John Henry agreed to build, at his expense, a 60,000 square-foot
building in exchange for a promise by T.G. & Y. to place one of its
stores in the building. T.G., & Y. then entered into a twenty year lease
that included a clause prohibiting it from halting rent payments. 8 Henry
pledged the lease as security and borrowed approximately $1.5 million
to construct the building.9 T.G. & Y. first occupied the building in 1981
and continued to make timely lease payments through 1986 when Mc-
Crory Corp. purchased T.G. & Y..10
In an effort to scale down operations, McCrory closed 202 T.G. &
Y. stores. McCrory subleased or assigned only 46 of the stores' leases
and employed St erik Company to dispose of the remaining lease obliga-
1. John A. Henry & Co. v. T.G. & Y. Stores Co., 941 F.2d 1068 (10th Cir. 1991).
2. Car-X Service Systems, Inc. v. Kidd-Heller, 927 F.2d 511 (10th Cir. 1991).
3. Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Lario Enter., 942 F.2d 1519 (10th Cir. 1991).
4. Sangre De Cristo Dev. Co. v. United States, 932 F.2d 891 (loth Cir. 1991).
5. 941 F.2d 1068 (10th Cir. 1991).
6. Id. at 1071.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1070.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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tions." I Sterik attempted to terminate its lease with Henry by sending
him a closure notice and offering a lump-sum cash payment. 12 When
Sterik and Henry failed to reach an agreement, McCrory withheld March
and April rent. Henry was forced to seek relief from his lender, South-
land Insurance, because he was unable to pay the mortgage without Mc-
Crory's rental payments.' 3 At McCrory's request, and in exchange for
payment of the March and April rental payments, Henry discussed can-
cellation of the lease with Sterik. The parties were unable to reach an
agreement, and McCrory withheld rent from July 1987 to March 1988.14
Henry narrowly avoided foreclosure during that time but refused to ca-
pitulate to McCrory. Because of Henry's tenacity, McCrory resumed
rental payments in March 1988 and paid back all of the past rent due. 15
In his suit, Henry asserted that McCrory breached the lease agree-
ment by withholding rental payments. 16 He claimed that the presence
of a recalcitrant tenant diminished the value of the property, making it
harder to sell. 17 McCrory argued damages for diminished property
value should be based upon actual efforts to sell the property in the
market place.' 8 Further, evidence of a defaulting tenant alone was too
speculative and indefinite to determine the amount of diminution in
property value. McCrory urged that damages, if any, should not be
based on an incompetent standard, therefore, Henry's claim for breach
of contract should not be submitted to the jury. The jury decided the
question of damages and ultimately found for Henry.' 9
B. The Tenth Circuit Decision
In an opinion by Judge Logan,20 the Tenth Circuit rejected Mc-
Crory's argument. The court found that actually attempting to sell the





15. Id. at 1071.
16. Id. Henry also asserted that McCrory's actions tortiously interfered with his mort-
gage contract. The Oklahoma court had not yet recognized this particular claim. Relying
on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 A, cmt. b (1977), the Tenth Circuit sus-
tained Henry's cause of action and found McCrory had indeed tortiously interfered with
Henry's mortgage contract. Id. at 1072.
17. In support of his view, Henry offered the testimony of an experienced real estate
appraiser who stated the property's value had been diminished by $223,000 to $280,000.
Id. at 1071.
18. Henry, 941 F.2d at 1071 (citing Great Western Motor Lines v. Cozard, 417 P.2d 575,
578 (Okla. 1966) (Damages must be ascertainable "in some manner other than by mere
speculation conjecture or surmise, and by reference to some definite standard."). See also
OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 21 (1987) (damages must be clearly ascertainable in both their na-
ture and origin).
19. The jury awarded Henry $100,000.00 actual and $2,000,000.00 punitive damages
based on the contractual interference claim. Id.
20. Sitting as a member of a three judge panel comprised of Honorable Myron H.




property value. 2 1 Evidence need only show the extent of damages as a
matter of "just and reasonable inference." 22 The real estate appraiser's
opinion that the property value was diminished by McCrory's recalci-
trance was "sufficiently certain in nature and origin" that the extent of
damages could be "reasonably inferred." 23 Therefore, the breach of
contract claim had properly gone before the jury.
C. Conclusion
It may appear that the testimony of one appraiser is too speculative
a basis to determine the amount of damages to the value of the property.
However, Oklahoma courts and the Tenth Circuit have previously held
that testimonial evidence may be a sufficient means of determining dam-
ages when the appraiser is experienced and able to articulate how a de-
faulting tenant affects the value of leased property. 24 In Hornwood v.
Smith's Food King No. 1,25 the Nevada Supreme Court considered a fact
situation similar to Henry. The Nevada Supreme Court found that the
testimony of a leasing agent and developer was sufficient to determine
the diminution in property value when an anchor tenant left.2 6 Henry,
signals no departure or expansion of existing Oklahoma or Tenth Cir-
cuit law.
III. A COMMERCIAL TENANT MAY BE RELIEVED FROM STRICTLY
COMPLYING WITH UNAMBIGUOUS TERMS OF RENEWAL
IN A LEASE.
In Car-X Service Systems, Inc. v. Kidd-Heller,2 7 the Tenth Circuit found
that where the balanced equities of a situation allow, a court may relieve
a party from strict compliance with an unambiguous provision in a lease.
A. Factual Background
Olivette G. Kidd-Heller and Jacob Heller entered into a lease agree-
ment with Mr. and Mrs. Tanquary on September 27, 1967 (Tanquary/
Kidd-Heller Lease). The agreement allowed the Kidd-Hellers use and
possession of a parcel of real estate for a ten-year period.28 The lease
also provided three five-year options which, if all were exercised, would
have extended the lease to September 30, 1992.29
Car-X Service Systems entered into a lease agreement with Olivette
21. Henry, 941 F.2d at 1071 ("such direct and specific evidence is not required").
22. Id. (quoting Larrance Tank Corp. v. Burrough, 476 P.2d 346, 350 (Okla. 1970)
(citations omitted)).
23. Id.
24. See General Fin. Corp. v. Dillon, 172 F.2d 924 (10th Cir. 1949); Chorn v. Williams,
99 P.2d 1036 (Okla. 1940); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Sheets, 62 P.2d 91 (Okla.
1936).
25. 772 P.2d 1284 (Nev. 1989).
26. Id. at 1286.
27. 927 F.2d 511 (10th Cir. 1991).
28. Id. at 512.
29. Id.
19921
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B. Kidd-Heller and Jacob Heller on March 31, 1977 (Kidd-Heller/Car-X
Lease)30 for use of the same subject property of the Tanquary/Kidd-
Heller lease.3 1 The Kidd-Heller/Car-X lease was for an initial five-year
term with two five-year options,3 2 and required Car-X to exercise its op-
tion to renew at least six months prior to the termination of the current
term.3 3 In addition, Car-X was required to keep liability and property
damage insurance on the property and furnish Kidd-Heller with a certifi-
cate evidencing such coverage.
3 4
The first term of the Kidd-Heller/Car-X lease ended April 30, 1982.
Car-X exercised its first option to renew February 26, 1982, two months
before the lease ended, but four months later than the time by which
Car-X was required to exercise its option.3 5 Initially Kidd-Heller re-
fused to recognize Car-X's belated exercise of its option to renew. Two
months later, however, Kidd-Heller extended the lease for five years. 36
In May of 1986, a dispute arose as to whether Car-X obtained the
proper insurance on the property.3 7 Kidd-Heller's attorney sent Car-X
a letter on May 10, 1986, advising Car-X that the lease was being termi-
nated;3 8 Car-X would not be allowed to exercise its second option to
extend. On February 19, 1987, Car-X received notice that the lease
would be terminated as of April 30, 1987. In response, Car-X notified
Kidd-Heller that it intended to exercise its option to renew the lease for
the second five-year term.3 9 Car-X brought suit in the District Court of
Kansas seeking a temporary restraining order prohibiting Kidd-Heller
from terminating its lease with Car-X.40 Car-X also sought equitable
relief from the lease provision that required exercise of the option to
renew six months prior to the expiration of the current lease term.
4 1
Kidd-Heller argued that under Kansas law, the district court could
not relieve Car-X from complying with a clear and unambiguous provi-
30. Id. On April 7, 1977, Car-X also entered into a sublease agreement with its fran-
chisee, Mufflers of Kansas City, Inc. The agreement made Mufflers subject to the terms
and conditions of the Kidd-Heller/Car-X lease. Id.
31. Id. Only one provision in the Tanquary/Kidd-Heller lease, relating to alterations
in the property, was specifically incorporated into the Kidd-Heller/Car-X lease.
32. Id.
33. Car-X had to furnish written notice and deliver such notice personally or send it
via certified mail to Kidd-Heller. Id. at 512-13.
34. Id.
35. Id. Car-X explained that it had "inadvertently failed to extend the lease in a timely
fashion." Id.
36. Id.
37. During 1985 and 1986, Car-X had in place the required insurance, but failed to
provide a certificate of such coverage to Kidd-Heller. Id.
38. Id.
39. Car-X responded on June 3, 1986, by advising Kidd-Heller that it intended to
continue the lease "until the last option term in 1992, and beyond." Id.
40. Mufflers, the sub-tenant, also joined this suit.
41. Car-X initially argued that the Kidd-Heller/Car-X lease ran concurrent with the
Tanquary/Kidd-Heller lease. Based on this view, the five-year renewal period terminated
on September 30, 1982 not April 30, 1982, therefore, Car-X had timely exercised its op-
tion to renew on March 19, 1987. However, this approach was abandoned during the
course of the suit. Car-X, 927 F.2d at 514-15.
986 [Vol. 69:4
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sion of a contract under the guise of equitable relief.4 2 Kidd-Heller re-
lied on the holding of Gill Mortuary v. Sutoris, Inc.4 3 to argue that
equitable relief was not proper. However, the district court determined
that this was an appropriate case for equitable relief. The court relied
heavily on the fact that Car-X gave notice of intent to renew before the
leasehold term expired, and Kidd-Heller had in fact received such no-
tice. 44 In addition, if the option to renew was declared lost, it would do
great harm to Car-X, and allowing Car-X to remain a lessee for an addi-
tional five years would do comparatively little harm to Kidd-Heller.
4 5
Therefore, the court held that Car-X's exercise of its option did extend
the lease term for another five years.
B. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to grant eq-
uitable relief.4 6 The court observed that in Gill Mortuary, that court re-
fused to grant specific performance of two lease agreements. However,
the Gill Mortuary court suggested that equitable relief may be appropri-
ate in cases that presented facts different from those in Gill Mortuary.
4 7
The Tenth Circuit determined that Car-X was so distinguished from that
case. Gill Mortuary involved a lease that expired before the lessee at-
tempted to extend it, whereas, in the instant case, Car-X exercised its
option to renew the lease in clear and unambiguous language when the
current five-year term of the lease was still in force and effect. 4 8 Addi-
tionally, Kidd-Heller received notice of Car-X's intent to extend the
lease, and Car-X's failure to timely extend was not intentional or
willful.
4 9
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that the balanced
equities of the situation warranted granting an equitable remedy. If the
lease were forfeited, it would cause relatively great harm to Car-X, due
to the amount of money it spent on alterations to the property itself5 0
and the good-will and customer recognition it gained while conducting
business on the premises. 5 1 In the alternative, Kidd-Heller would suffer
relatively little harm if Car-X was allowed to continue its lease. The
lease provided an increase in rental payment for the second five-year
term.52 Kidd-Heller hid also taken no steps to lease the premises to
another tenant.5 3 The Tenth Circuit 'declined to disturb the district
42. Id. at 515.
43. 485 P.2d 1377 (Kan. 1971).
44. Id. at 516.
45. Id. at 516-17.
46. Car-X, 927 F.2d at 516.
47. Id. at 516 (citing Gill Mortuary, 485 P.2d at 1380).
48. Id.
49. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
50. Both Car-X and Mufflers expended in excess of $10,000 for alterations and im-
provements to the property. Car-X, 927 F.2d at 512.
51. Id. at 516-17.
52. The lease provided for an increase of $100.00 per month in the rental payment
for the second five year term. Id. at 513.
53. Id. at 517.
1992]
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court's holding.
C. Conclusion
Courts will generally give contractual language its plain meaning
M
and not read any other rights or obligations into an agreement. Often
times in the commercial context, however, situations arise requiring eq-
uitable relief so a lease will not be forfeited due to oversight.5 5 In its
decision, the Tenth Circuit initially stressed the presence of two factors:
(1) Car-X had exercised its option to extend before the lease expired;
and (2) Car-X did not willfully or intentionally fail to renew the lease.
5 6
The court then examined the equities of the situation and concluded
that Car-X should be relieved from strictly complying with the renewal
provision in the lease. Absent a showing of these two factors, however,
the court will not relieve a party from complying with a contractual pro-
vision under the guise of equitable relief.
IV. BEFORE GRANTING A MANDATORY INJUNCTION, THE COURT NEED
NOT CONSIDER EQUITIES OR PUBLIC POLICY IF AN EASEMENT
IS CLEARLY DEFINED, LEGALLY PROTECTED AND
THE ENCROACHING PARTY Is NOT
INNOCENT.
In Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Lario Enterprises, Inc. ,57 the Tenth Circuit
found that an easement owner was entitled to a mandatory injunction.
The district court erred in balancing the equities between the parties
where the easement rights were clearly defined and legally protected
and the encroaching party acted with knowledge of the easement.
A. Factual Background
Mid-America Pipeline Co. (Mid-America) purchased and duly re-
corded certain easements across undeveloped farmland in 1960.58 The
easements granted Mid-America:
the right to clear and keep clear all trees, undergrowth and
other obstructions from the . . . right of way, and Grantor
agrees not to build, construct or create any buildings or other
structures on the herein granted right of way that will interfere
with the normal operation and maintenance of the said line or
lines. 59
Mid-America installed two high-pressure liquid gas pipelines
54. ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CoNTRars § 535 (3rd ed. 1963).
55. For a general discussion of this matter, see Circumstances Excusing Lessee's Fail-
ure to Give Timely Notice or Exercise of Option to Renew or Extend Lease 27 A.L.R. 4th
266 (1984). See also Linn Corp. v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 424 N.E.2d 676, 678-79 (Ill. App. 3d
1981); Wharf Restaurant, Inc. v. Port of Seattle, 605 P.2d 334, 340-41 (Wash. App. 1979).
56. Car-X, 927 F.2d at 516.
57. 942 F.2d 1519 (10th Cir. 1991).
58. Id. at 1522.
59. Id. The easement in its entirety is reprinted in Mid-America Pipeline v. Lario En-
terprises, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 511, 513-514 (D.Kan. 1989).
[Vol. 69:4
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through the easements that were buried thirty to forty-eight inches be-
low ground.60 In the summer of 1988, Mid-America learned of Lario
Enterprises', Inc. (Lario) plans to build an asphalt race track on the
property through which Mid-America had its easements. Mid-America
promptly notified Lario of its easement rights, objected to the construc-
tion and sought a preliminary injunction in the district court of
Kansas.
6 1
The district court first concluded that the asphalt tracks interfered
with the "normal operation and maintenance" of the pipelines under
the language of the easement.6 2 Therefore, the tracks violated Mid-
America's easement rights.63 However, the district court denied the in-
junction based on three factors: (1) Mid-America had an adequate rem-
edy in condemnation or damages; (2) an injunction would place an
undue hardship on the defendants because the tracks were already sub-
stantially constructed; and (3) risk to the public due to Mid-America's
hindered ability to inspect the pipes, in light of the history of the pipes'
safe operation.6 Mid-America appealed to the Tenth Circuit.
B. The Legal Background
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 936 applies a seven-part test
to determine the appropriate circumstances for granting a mandatory
injunction.6 5 The test primarily focuses on the adequacy of the legal
remedy, the relative hardship of the parties and the interest of the pub-
lic.6 6 When the district court action was brought by Mid-America, the
appropriate test for granting a mandatory injunction had not yet been
determined by the Kansas courts.
67
Before Mid-America appealed the instant case, the Kansas
Supreme Court decided Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Wietharn.68  In
Wietharn, the Kansas Supreme Court set forth three requirements that a
party seeking injunctive relief must meet: (1) reasonable probability of
injury exists; (2) no adequate remedy at law; and (3) clear entitlement to
60. Mid-America, 942 F.2d at 1522 (quoting Mid-America, 716 F. Supp. at 513).
61. Id. (quoting Mid-America, 716 F. Supp. at 514).
62. The plan for construction of the race track and surrounding facilities is set forth
in Mid-America, 716 F. Supp. at 514.
63. Mid-America, 716 F. Supp. at 515.
64. Id. at 513.
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 936 (1981) provides in pertinent part:
(1) The appropriateness of the remedy of injunction against a tort depends upon
a comparative appraisal of all of the factors in the case, including the following
primary factors:
(a) the nature of the interest to be protected,
(b) the relative adequacy to the plaintiff of injunction and of other remedies,
(c) any unreasonable delay by the plaintiff in bringing suit,
(d) any related misconduct on the part of the plaintiff, (e) the relative hard-
ship likely to result to defendant if an injunction is granted and to plaintiff if it is
denied,
(f) the interests of third persons and of the public, and
(g) the practicability of framing and enforcing the order or judgment.
66. Id.
67. Mid-America, 716 F. Supp at 511.
68. 787 P.2d 716 (Kan. 1990).
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a mandatory injunction. 6 9 Unlike § 936 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, under Wietharn the court should not balance the equities of a
situation nor consider the public interest 70 where the encroaching party
acted with knowledge of the easement and was, therefore, not
"innocent."
7 1
C. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court's reliance on the
seven part test in § 936 of the Restatement was misplaced. 72 Applying
the criteria set forth under Wietharn, the Tenth Circuit determined that
Mid-America was entitled to an injunction. The court first found that
Lario acted with knowledge of Mid-America's easement. Mid-America's
rights under the easement were clearly defined and properly protected
by law. 73 Under the easement, Mid-America had the right to freedom
from "buildings or other structures on the.., right of way that [would]
interfere with the normal operation and maintenance" of pipelines.
74
Lario argued it innocently believed the race track was not a "building or
structure" contemplated by the easement. Lario constructed the track,
ignorant of the fact they were abridging the easement and, therefore,
innocently encroached upon Mid-America's rights.
7 5
The Tenthi Circuit disagreed with Lario's position. The court
found that despite its professional belief the race track would not inter-
fere with Mid-America's easement, Lario did not proceed with construc-
tion without knowledge or warning of Mid-America's property rights.
7 6
Lario was not innocent and, therefore, not entitled to a balancing of
equities under Wietharn.
The Tenth Circuit then considered the first prong of the Wietharn
test: Whether there was a reasonable probability that Mid-America was
injured by construction of the race track. 77 Focusing on the intent of
the parties, 78 the court initially found the asphalt race track was a pro-
hibited "structure" under the easement. 7 9 The court agreed with Lario
that the term was ambiguous. However, at the time the easements
were executed, Lario was using the property for pasture and agricul-
tural purposes. Mid-America also plotted the pipelines to avoid devel-
oped property.8 0 Therefore, the court found that the race track was
69. Id. at 719-20.
70. Id.
71. Wietharn, 787 P.2d at 725.
72. Mid-America, 942 F.2d at 1524.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1522.
75. Id. at 1525.
76. Mid-America, 942 F.2d at 1525 (quoting Papanikolas Brothers v. Sugarhouse Shopping
Center, 535 P.2d 1256, 1259 (Utah 1975)).
77. Id.





within what the parties intended the term "structure" to include.8 1
The Tenth Circuit then found the asphalt race track82 interfered
with the "normal operation and maintenance"8 3 of Mid-America's pipe-
lines. The race track impaired Mid-America's ability to detect leaks in
their lines and would increase the expense of repairing the lines.84 Cit-
ing Aladdin Petroleum Corp. v. Gold Crown Properties,8 5 the Tenth Circuit
concluded that this level of interference was material enough to inter-
fere with Mid-America's enjoyment of the easement. 86 Such interfer-
ence constituted actionable injury under the first prong of Wietharn.
The Tenth Circuit found that Mid-America also met the second
prong of Wietharn because it had no adequate remedy at law. In
Wietharn, the court granted a mandatory injunction ordering the re-
moval of four buildings constructed over another one of Mid-America's
pipeline easements.8 7 Similar to the buildings, the Tenth Circuit found
the asphalt race track created a continuing violation that did not cease
with the completion of the track.88 Therefore, damages would inade-
quately remedy the violation.8 9
With little guidance as to what constituted "clear entitlement"
under the third prong of the Wietharn test,90 the Tenth Circuit looked to
the similarity of the facts in Wietharn and Mid-America. In Wietharn, the
Kansas Supreme Court found "clear entitlement" to an injunction. Ac-
cording to the Tenth Circuit, the facts in the two cases were alike, there-
fore, the Tenth Circuit found that Mid-America was "clearly entitled" to
injunctive relief as well.9 1
D. Conclusion
Courts are reluctant to require the destruction of buildings or struc-
tures after substantial construction. Courts regard such destruction as
wasteful. Even if the structure encroaches upon the property rights of
81. Applying similar logic, the Tenth Circuit found that the "fences, concrete barri-
ers, and additional cover" were also "structures" under the easement. Id. The Tenth
Circuit rejected the argument that "structure" is synonymous with "building." Id. at 1527.
82. The court found that the concrete barriers and fences, while "structures" under
the easement, did not "materially interfere" with Mid-America's easement rights, primarily
because they were moveable. Id.
83. Id.
84. Mid-America, 716 F. Supp at 514.
85. 561 P.2d 818 (Kan. 1977).
86. Mid-America, 942 F.2d at 1527.
87. Wietham, 787 P.2d at 725.
88. Id.
89. Mid-America, 942 F.2d at 1528. Lario also argued that Mid-America had the rem-
edy of reverse condemnation because Lario had deeded the property to the City of To-
peka with an agreement that it would be reconveyed after twenty-three years. The Tenth
Circuit dismissed this by stating that it was speculative whether the construction would
constitute a "taking" entitling Mid-America to compensation. Even if it was found to be a
taking, reverse condemnation was a vehicle whereby a party was entitled to money dam-
ages which the court concluded would be inadequate to remedy the easement violation
here. Id.
90. Id. at 1529.
91. Id. at 1529-30.
1992]
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another, equity favors keeping the structure intact. However, after Mid-
America, a party claiming violation of easement rights may preclude the
court from considering the equities of a situation by proving their rights
are clearly defined and legally secured.
It may appear that the Tenth Circuit's holding in Kidd-Heller is con-
tradictory to the instant case. Both cases involve unambiguous provi-
sions in contracts granting property rights. In Kidd-Heller, though, the
Tenth Circuit weighed the equities of the situation and relieved Car-X
from strict compliance with the renewal provision in the lease. The
cases can be reconciled, in so far as the court, in both cases, initially
looked at the innocence of the violating parties and the property rights.
In Car-X, the court found the lessee acted innocently and before the un-
derlying lease expired. Additionally, the lessor's actions arguably
showed that strict compliance with the renewal provision was not essen-
tial.9 2 Therefore, the court found the facts of Car-X warranted examina-
tion of the equities. In Mid-America, however, the court found the
easement rights were clear and legally protected. The violating party,
Lario, acted with knowledge of the easement and, therefore, was not
innocent. The court found no circumstances that warranted a consider-
ation of the equities in this case.
The decision in Mid-America upholds the principles of reliability and
certainty in the law. Mid-America performed its obligation to legally se-
cure its property rights. The Tenth Circuit did not allow Lario to bene-
fit from violating those rights merely because it would be wasteful and
costly to destroy the encroaching structure. The holding reflects Lario's
mistake, regardless of the expense and destruction. This decision sends
a message to contractors to be wary of the rights they infringe upon.
Contractors should be discouraged from taking a chance and building
on another's property, in the hope equity will side with them after the
construction is complete.
V. FEDERAL APPROVAL OF A LEASE MUST BE VALID UNDER THE
APPLICABLE CODE SECTION OR THE LESSEE'S INTEREST DOES
NOT VEST FOR PURPOSES OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT TAKINGS CLAUSE.
In Sangre De Cristo Development v. United States,93 the Department of
the Interior (Department) failed initially to validly approve a lease under
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).94 As a result, the Tenth
Circuit found that Sangre De Cristo Development (Sangre) did not have
a vested property interest in the lease. Sangre, therefore, did not have
standing to assert a claim under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause
9 5
when the lease was later rescinded by the Department.
92. See supra notes 36, 37 and accompanying text.
93. 932 F.2d 891 (10th Cir. 1991).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 4321.




Sangre negotiated a lease with the Tesuque Indian Pueblo to de-
velop approximately 5000 acres of Pueblo land for a world-class golf
course and residential community.96 The Department approved the
lease,9 7 and Sangre began selling residential lots on the leased land.
Shortly thereafter, two environmental groups filed suit against the
United States seeking to enjoin construction. They claimed the Depart-
ment's approval was invalid because it did not undertake an Environ-
mental Impact Statement 9 8 (EIS) prior to approval. 99 The New Mexico
District Court denied the request for injunctive relief on the grounds
that no EIS was required. 0 0 The Tenth Circuit reversed,' 0 holding
that the Secretary's approval of the lease triggered the need for an
EIS.1
0 2
While the EIS was being prepared, the Pueblo, under new leader-
ship, formally requested that the Department void the lease. 10 3 One
year and three months later, the Department announced it would re-
scind its approval of the lease based upon environmental considerations
and the Pueblo's opposition."° 4 Sangre thereafter went into bankruptcy
and the trustee brought a civil action on behalf of the estate. The
Trustee claimed, inter alia,105 that when the Department rescinded its
approval of the lease, this action constituted a taking under the Fifth
Amendment, 10 6 thereby entitling Sangre to recover just compensation.
B. Legal Background
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which prohibits the
taking of property for public use without just compensation, is directed
at an act by government that attempts to authorize the seizure or de-
struction of property against the owner's will. 107 A two step analysis is
96. Sangre De Cristo, 932 F.2d at 893.
97. Because Sangre was leasing Indian lands to develop for public recreational use,
under 25 U.S.C. § 415(a) (1970) approval of the lease by the Secretary of the Department
of the Interior was required.
98. NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 - 4375. For a general discussion on the purpose and
process of undertaking an Environmental Impact Statement, see JAN IArros, NATURAL RE-
SOURCES LAw 95-111 (1985).
99. Sangre De Cristo, 932 F.2d at 893.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. The Tenth Circuit concluded the Secretary of the Interior's approval of the lease
would have "significantly affected the quality of the human environment," therefore, ap-
proval was a "major federal action." NEPA 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2)(C); Davis v. Morton, 469
F.2d 593, 597 (10th Cir. 1972). For a discussion of what constitutes "major federal ac-
tion," see generally FREDERICK ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
NATIONAL EVIRONMENTAL POLICY Aar 89-105 (1973).
103. Sangre De Cristo, 932 F.2d at 893.
104. Id.
105. Sangre De Cristo asserted several breach of contract and breach of trust claims
that the Tenth Circuit addressed separately.
106. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
107. JULIUS L. SACHMAN, 2 NICHoLs' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.01 (rev. 3rd ed.
1990).
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used to determine whether a "taking" has occurred.' 0 8 The asserting
party must prove: (1) at the time the taking occurred, the party had a
vested interest in the subject property;10 9 and (2) the government's ac-
tion constituted a taking under the Fifth Amendment.' 10
C. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit held that Sangre did not possess a vested interest
in the lease when the Department rescinded its approval."II The first
prong under the Fifth Amendment "takings" test was not met, there-
fore, the court did not address the second."
12
Sangre argued the effect of requiring an EIS, after the Department
approved the lease only enjoined the project from continuing until San-
gre completed the EIS. 13 It did not affect the Department's approval.
The Tenth Circuit declined to accept Sangre's view. The court in-
terpreted NEPA to require an EIS beforie the Department had the au-
thority to approve the lease between Sangre and the Pueblo.
114
Further, agents of a regulatory agency must act within the bounds of
their congressionally delegated authority.' 1-5 The court held it was
outside the bounds of the Department's authority to approve the lease
before the EIS was completed."16 Because the EIS was not completed
prior to approval, the lease was invalid. The Tenth Circuit concluded
that because Sangre had no vested property interest in the lease when
the Department rescinded its approval, Sangre did not meet the first
prong of the Fifth Amendment "takings" test.' 1 7
108. In re Consolidated Atmospheric Testing Litigation, 820 F.2d 982, 988 (9th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 905 (1988).
109. For instance, it has been held that even though a cause of action is considered to
be a species of property, a plaintiffhas no vested right in any tort claim for damages under
state law. Ducharme v. Merrill-National Labs, 574 F.2d 1307, 1309 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1002 (1978).
110. In other words, courts consider the nature and extent of the governmental inva-
sion in the second prong of the test. In re Consolidated at 989. For instance, a court con-
cluded that the governmental action did not amount to a "taking" since it did not abrogate
the personal injury claims of the plaintiff. The government merely subjected the plaintiff's
claims to the tort claims procedure under 28 U.S.C. § 2680, which had the practical effect
of allowing the defendant to shield himself from liability based on certain exceptions
under 28 U.S.C. § 2680. Id. at 984.
111. Sangre De Cristo, 932 F.2d at 894.
112. See supra notes 108-111 and accompanying text.
113. Id.
114. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
115. Gray v. Johnson, 395 F.2d 533, 537 (10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 906
(1968). See Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d at 594 (Department of the Interior was without
authority to grant a lease where no environmental impact study was conducted prior to
approval of the lease). See also Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384
(1947) (holding that the government is not bound when its agent enters into an agreement
that falls outside the agent's congressionally delegated authority).
116. Sangre De Cristo, 932 F.2d at 894-895. The one who is seeking the approval of the
agency assumes the risk that the agency is acting within its authority. Cray, 395 F.2d at
537.




The Tenth Circuit is the first circuit to address the specific issues
presented in Sangre. If the grant or sale of property rights requires fed-
eral approval, after Sangre, it is uncertain when those rights will vest. It
is clear that the steps an agency takes, or should have taken, before it
gives its approval, are pivotal to determining when property rights vest.
However, the Tenth Circuit provided no guidance on how to ensure that
the proper steps are being taken by an agency. Sangre places a heavy
burden upon those entering property transactions requiring federal
consent. Those acquiring property rights must car~fully scrutinize the
degree of federal approval required, and anticipate what further meas-
ures may be necessary to make the approval valid.
VI. CONCLUSION
The cases decided this term primarily involved landlords and com-
mercial tenants. The Tenth Circuit decisions appear to show no consis-
tent pattern of deference to either property owners or lessors. In Mid-
America, Sangre and Henry, the court's approach focused on a literal in-
tepretation of the property owner's rights. The court was unswayed by
the equities of these cases that supported the lessors. The court en-
gaged in a seemingly opposite analysis in Car-X. There the court con-
cluded that equity warranted relieving the commercial tenant from a
clear provision in his lease.
The analysis of these decisions may vary, but their outcomes reflect
the same message. TheTenth Circuit strikes a balance between main-
taining the integrity of express property rights and the equities of a situ-
ation that demand those rights be overlooked. In following the Tenth
Circuit, courts should first scutinize express property rights, the owner's
authority to grant rights to others and the violating party's innocence. If
these factors are unclear, only then should a court focus on the equities
of a case.
Denise Speas
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